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On the Scope of a Professional’s Right of
Conscience
David Lefkowitz

University of Richmond
Under what conditions, if any, do medical professionals
enjoy a right of conscience? That is, when must a just state
accommodate a physician’s, pharmacist’s, or other medical
professional’s refusal to provide legally and professionally
sanctioned services to which she morally objects; for example,
by enacting laws that enable her to do so without fear of losing
her job or her professional privileges?1 Recent assertions by
several pharmacists of a right to conscientiously refuse to
fill prescriptions for the so-called morning-after pill, and by a
California fertility doctor of a right to conscientiously refuse to
provide fertility treatment to a lesbian, have once again made this
question a prominent topic of discussion amongst philosophers
and professional ethicists. Nearly all argue (correctly, in my
view) that if it entails the imposition of excessive burdens
on others, then the state may justifiably refuse to recognize

a professional’s right of conscience. However, a number of
prominent applied ethicists also endorse a second constraint
on the professional’s right of conscience, arguing that it extends
only to certain kinds of beliefs; specifically, only those that are
reasonable, or integral to the ethical practice of medicine,
or not at odds with a principle of non-discrimination. This I
think mistaken. As I will now demonstrate, if the fundamental
moral importance of preserving an agent’s integrity provides
the justificatory basis for a professional’s right of conscience,
a position most of the authors I consider here explicitly adopt,
then medical professionals enjoy a pro tanto or defeasible claim
to accommodation by the state regardless of the content of the
belief to which they wish to remain true.
One of the most common arguments offered by
contemporary writers in defense of a medical professional’s
right of conscience appeals to the fundamental moral
importance of preserving an agent’s integrity.2 A person acts
with integrity in a particular case if and only if she conforms
to certain standards that she believes apply to her in that case.
To compromise one’s integrity, then, is to fail to conform to a
certain standard in circumstances where one believes that one
could, and should, do so. Though these standards need not be
moral ones—for example, a musician might compromise her
integrity as an artist by “selling out” to a large corporation—I will
focus here solely on moral standards, and so moral integrity.
The preservation of a person’s moral integrity is of greater
prudential and moral concern the more central conformity to a
particular moral standard is to that person’s identity or sense of
self, and her conception of what makes her life meaningful or
worthwhile. If an agent betrays one or more of her core moral
commitments, then her ability to lead what she believes to be
a good life will be grievously harmed. Typically, when a person
asserts that she cannot in good conscience perform a certain
action, what she means is that were she to do so she would
compromise her moral integrity.
Most people will readily agree that states have a duty
to ensure that their subjects enjoy their basic moral rights.
Suppose, somewhat more controversially, that people have
basic moral rights to those goods in the absence of which it is
extremely unlikely that they will live a good life, whatever its
specifics. I suggest that the preservation of an agent’s integrity
constitutes a necessary condition for living a good life, and
therefore it is something to which all people have a basic moral
right. It follows that if it is to be legitimate (and perhaps if it is to
be just), the state must at least make a good faith effort to protect
its subjects’ attempts to act with integrity. That is, it must grant
them a right of conscience. This right is not absolute; rather, in
some cases the moral demands it generates will be outweighed
or defeated by duties that correlate to other basic moral rights, or
perhaps other types of moral considerations. That is why nearly
all theorists (though, alas, not all laws) characterize the right
of conscience as a conditional, qualified, or prima facie one.
Nevertheless, the critical importance of acting with integrity for
a person’s ability to lead a good life grounds a weighty moral
claim against the state that it refrain from compelling people
to betray their deepest commitments.3
The foregoing account of the right of conscience clearly
justifies the state in investigating the sincerity of a conscientious
objector’s belief. After all, if that person does not truly believe
that his legal and professional obligations are at odds with his
moral ones, then acting as the law requires will not actually
cause him to compromise his integrity. Grounding a right of
conscience in the fundamental importance of preserving
an agent’s integrity also justifies the state in exploring the
centrality of the commitment threatened by compliance with
the law to the agent’s sense of self and her understanding of
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life’s meaning and worth. The more peripheral compliance
with the standard in question is to a person’s self-worth, selfrespect, and ability to lead a good life, the less weight her
right of conscience will carry in cases where it conflicts with
other moral considerations, and vice versa. However, nothing
in the argument from integrity warrants the state making its
accommodation of a conscientious objector conditional on the
justifiability or reasonableness of the commitment she believes
she will betray if she obeys the law. The point of a right of
conscience is to protect a person’s ability to conform to those
standards she believes are binding on her, regardless of whether
they actually are. All the state need ascertain, therefore, is that
the agent sincerely believes that complying with the law will
require her to violate certain moral commitments, in which
case the law threatens her integrity. This does not mean that
the state should rescind from making any judgments of moral
truth or rational justifiability; it will (or at least should) do so
when it legislates, and it will (or should) do so when, in cases
of conflict, it balances the professional’s right of conscience
against competing moral considerations. Nevertheless, if the
fundamental moral importance of preserving an agent’s integrity
does provide a sufficient justification for a conditional right of
conscience, then it does so for any belief an agent might have,
no matter how unreasonable or reprehensible it may be.4
Dan Brock explicitly endorses the argument from integrity
for a conditional right of conscience. Preserving an agent’s
integrity, he writes, “gives others reason to respect her doing
so [i.e., not violating her moral commitments], not because
those commitments must be true or justified, but because the
maintenance of moral integrity is an important value, central
to one’s status as a moral person.”5 Yet immediately after
presenting this rationale for a right of conscience, he maintains
that a white physician who sincerely believes in the immorality
of the mixing of the races lacks even a conditional claim to
accommodation by his employer, the professional organizations
to which he belongs, or the state that (indirectly) licenses him
to practice medicine. Why? Brock answers as follows:
a social consensus (not to say unanimity) exists
in the United States that racial discrimination in
access to services like health care is unethical, and
this is reflected in the law as well. Most people
would consider Dr. A. [the racist physician] unjustly
prejudiced, despite his offering a moral or religious
defense of his position. Dr. A’s belief does not deserve
respect, even if his moral integrity does. Public policy
holds that social justice requires prohibiting this form
of discrimination and that if Dr. A’s moral beliefs and
integrity are in conflict with this policy, they and not
the policy must give way.6
By itself, the fact that most people think Dr. A’s moral belief
mistaken does not justify denying him even a conditional right
of conscience. After all, a liberal state guarantees its citizens
a great deal of freedom to act in ways the majority believes to
be immoral. More importantly, given that Brock thinks the right
of conscience has its justificatory basis in the importance of
acting with integrity, and that the value of acting with integrity
does not depend on the truth or justifiability of a person’s
commitments, the unjustly prejudicial nature of Dr. A’s beliefs
makes no difference to his claim to accommodation. While
Brock rightly claims that “Dr. A’s belief does not deserve respect,
even if his moral integrity does,” he fails to draw the proper
conclusion from this observation, which is that respect for Dr.
A’s moral integrity requires that the state acknowledge Dr. A’s
conditional right to act as his conscience dictates.
In many circumstances, the cost to patients in need of the
services that Dr. A can provide, and/or the cost to the state (and

so its citizens) of accommodating Dr. A’s conscientious refusal to
treat black patients may be excessive. That is, accommodating
Dr. A’s conscience may make it unreasonably burdensome
for black patients to get the medical treatment to which they
are morally and legally entitled, or for the state to ensure they
have access to such treatment. When this is so, the state will
not wrong Dr. A if it forces him to choose between providing
legal services he believes to be immoral or exiting the medical
profession (or at least the particular professional role he
currently occupies).7 Yet there is no reason to assume that the
cost of accommodating a professional’s desire to conform to a
principle that conflicts with legal and professional prohibitions
on discrimination will always be excessive. Consider, for
example, Benitez v. NCWC, a recent case in California in
which two physicians at a fertility clinic conscientiously refused
to provide treatment for an unmarried lesbian woman. The
actual grounds for the physicians’ refusal to treat Benitez
are a matter of dispute; they claimed to object to providing
services to unmarried women, while Benitez claimed they
discriminated against her on the basis of her sexual orientation.
For the purposes of this paper, we can simply stipulate that the
physicians conscientiously objected to using their services to
help homosexuals have children, say because they thought
doing so would make them complicit in a sinful activity. As
Jacob M. Appel points out, neither a commitment to ensuring
the availability of fertility treatment for lesbians, nor the harm
caused by the social stigma and discomfort associated with
being refused care, warrant the state’s failure to accommodate
the physicians’ desire to remain true to their beliefs.8 Benitez
had no difficulty finding another physician willing to provide
the services she sought. Nor is there any evidence that the
number of fertility doctors conscientiously opposed to treating
lesbians is large enough that some prospective homosexual
patients are likely to have a significant burden imposed upon
them if the state acknowledges a right of conscience in such
cases, even if Benitez did not. As for the discomfort of being
refused care, Appel suggests that it is (or could be made to be)
relatively easy for lesbians seeking fertility treatment to identify
and avoid those physicians that refuse to serve them. It might
be said in response that merely knowing that you cannot obtain
services from certain medical professionals because they think
a central feature of your way of life immoral harms a person. But
even if it does, it is not obvious that this setback to a lesbian’s
ability to lead a life she finds meaningful or worthwhile is
weighty enough to justify the state’s refusal to accommodate
a physician’s conscience.
Mark Wicclair also maintains that the importance of
protecting an agent’s integrity provides the justificatory basis for
a physician’s conditional right of conscience. The moral weight
of a conscience-based objection to performing a legal service,
Wicclair writes, “can be grounded in the value of moral integrity
and self-respect as well as the significant harm associated with
self-betrayal and loss of self-respect.”9 Like Brock, however,
Wicclair also attempts to limit the kind of commitments for
which a medical professional may seek accommodation.
Specifically, he contends that a physician’s assertion of a right
not to provide a particular treatment to which he conscientiously
objects carries moral weight only if the standard he seeks
to uphold references the goals and values of medicine. To
illustrate, on Wicclair’s account a physician enjoys a conditional
moral claim to exemption from a legal requirement to provide
a given medical service if his reason for doing so appeals to
an understanding of the duties to advance patients’ interests
in life and health that is at odds with the one the law reflects.
Brock’s racist doctor, however, lacks even a conditional claim
to the state’s accommodation of his conscience, since the
standard to which he wishes to conform is foreign to the goals
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and values of medicine.
Why should our concern with preserving physicians’
moral integrity and self-respect, and with protecting them from
the significant harm associated with self-betrayal and loss of
self-respect, be limited to cases where the objector aims to
uphold a commitments that “correspond[s] to one or more
core values in medicine?” Surely there is nothing inherently
different between the betrayal of principles integral to the ethical
practice of medicine and those that are not, such that the former
necessarily impose a far greater cost on people than does the
latter. Why, then, does Wicclair shift from a concern to protect
moral integrity per se to a concern to protect moral integrity only
insofar as the principles to which a physician wishes to conform
correspond to a core value in medicine? The answer is that he
thinks it necessary to explain why medical professionals ought
to enjoy a conditional claim to accommodation when most
other professionals (and non-professionals) do not.
Suppose, as is almost always the case, that when an agent’s
legal and professional obligations conflict with her moral
beliefs, she can resolve the conflict and avoid self-betrayal by
exiting the profession (or at least that particular role within the
profession). In many cases, that is what a person must do if
she wishes to preserve her moral integrity. Why is the same
not true for medical professionals? Some justification must
be given for why the state should acknowledge a conditional
right to accommodation for a physician that conscientiously
objects to providing certain legal services to her patients, as
in the case of a Catholic doctor who thinks abortion is never
morally permissible, but not for an advertising executive who
conscientiously objects to working on an advertising campaign
that promotes smoking because she thinks it would make
her complicit in causing tobacco-related harms to people
that have not freely and knowingly exposed themselves to
the risk of those harms. Wicclair argues, correctly in my
view, that this differential treatment cannot be grounded in a
necessary inequality in the impact that physicians and other
professionals can have on others’ well-being, autonomy, or life
prospects. Whatever wrong or harm is involved in a physician’s
conscientious refusal to heed a terminally ill patient’s request
to have his feeding-tube removed may pale in comparison to
the harm caused by an advertising campaign encouraging the
use of tobacco. Instead, Wicclair suggests that a justification for
according medical professionals, but not others, a conditional
right of conscience can be found in the fact that medicine is a
moral enterprise. This means that physicians should act on the
basis of their obligations to patients, not self-interest, and that
they should conduct themselves according to ethical values
and professional standards, rather than as mere technicians
providing whatever services their patients demand. What
follows from this conception of medicine, Wicclair maintains,
“is not that physicians should be guided by their personal
values, irrespective of their content. Rather, the implication
is that physicians should be guided by the goals and values
of medicine.”10 Medicine’s special moral character, he seems
to suggest, explains both why medical professionals, but not
others, ought to enjoy a conditional right to accommodation
by the state, and why that right encompasses only fidelity to
principles that are integral to the practice of medicine.
This argument suffers from two defects. First, Wicclair
needs to show that in their professional lives physicians should
be guided only by the goals and values of medicine, so that
he can then argue that only appeal to these ends can ground
a physician’s right of conscience. No such inference follows
from his characterization of medicine as a moral enterprise,
however. A female doctor who sincerely believes that morality
forbids her from treating men, and who asserts a conditional

right to practice in accordance with this belief, acts neither
from self-interest nor as a mere technician. Rather, she seeks
to uphold the practice of medicine as a moral enterprise and
conform to a further moral principle that does not correspond
to any value in medicine. Wicclair might respond that nondiscrimination in the provision of treatment is a value integral
to the practice of medicine, and cite in support of such a claim
the World Medical Association’s 1948 Declaration of Geneva, as
amended in 1994 and 2005, which states that a physician will
not (or, more accurately, should not) permit “‘considerations
of age, disease, or disability, creed, ethnic origin, gender,
nationality, political affiliation, race, sexual orientation, social
standing or any other factor to intervene between [her] duty
and [her] patient.” Despite the World Medical Association’s
assertion, one might contest the claim that non-discrimination
is a value integral to the practice of medicine, even if it is a true
moral principle. More importantly, by hypothesis our physician
is not denying that she has some duty to male patients—after
all, the right she asserts is a conditional one. What is at issue
is the specific content of the physician’s duty to male patients.
Suppose that the objecting physician acknowledges a duty to
ensure that male patients receive the types of treatment she is
licensed to provide, but objects only to providing those services
herself (as might be the case if her reason for refusing to treat
male patients rests on her belief in a duty of sexual modesty).
If this is all our physician asserts, then I maintain that either the
actions the physician seeks to carry out without penalty do not
violate her duty as described in the Declaration of Geneva, or
that declaration’s characterization of the physician’s duty is
morally unsound.
Note that I am not claiming that professional medical
associations err when they assert that their members act
unethically if they discriminate in the provision of their
professional services on the basis of race, sex or gender, ethnicity,
creed, nationality, political affiliation, or sexual orientation.
Rather, I maintain only that even if this assertion is true (as I
believe it is), it does not necessarily follow that those physicians
who disagree with it have no claim to accommodation by the
state or the professional bodies to whom it delegates some of
its authority to regulate the practice of medicine.
Recall that Wicclair limits a physician’s right of conscience
to cases of fidelity to a principle consonant with the goals and
values of medicine because he thinks it necessary to explain
why physicians have a defeasible claim to accommodation by
their employer and the state, while advertising executives, and
many other professionals and non-professionals, have no such
claim. But simply limiting the scope of a right of conscience to
certain features that are allegedly unique (or nearly unique)
to the medical profession does not suffice to justify such a
restriction. Rather, Wicclair must explain what is special about
these values, such that fidelity to them but not to other values
warrants accommodation. His failure to do so constitutes a
second shortcoming with his argument. I conclude, therefore,
that Wicclair fails to establish that when the principle or
commitment a physician seeks to uphold does not correspond
to a core value in medicine, he or she lacks even a conditional
moral claim to accommodation.
Were Wicclair to abandon any attempt to defend the
current asymmetry in the respective legal accommodations
extended to physicians and advertising executives, then it seems
he would have no reason to place any constraints on the kind
of moral beliefs the desire to remain true to which justifies a
moral claim to accommodation. Alternatively, it may be possible
to offer a justification for the differential treatment afforded
to medical professionals that does not place any restrictions
on the sort of commitment for which a physician might seek
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accommodation. For instance, differences in the institutional
context in which professionals (and non-professionals) practice
may justify legal accommodation for some, e.g., physicians
that conscientiously object to providing certain treatments,
but not others, e.g., advertising executives that conscientiously
object to working on tobacco promotion campaigns. Given the
highly regulated environment in which medical professionals
already practice, it may be possible to implement a scheme
for accommodating conscientiously objecting physicians
without imposing much cost on potential patients, professional
colleagues, employers, taxpayers, or the state. The same may
not be true for advertising executives. If so, then the advertising
executive’s claim to accommodation may be defeated by other
moral considerations, such as the cost to employers and to
the taxpayer of institutionalizing such a scheme. The key point
here is not the truth of these claims regarding the relative costs
of accommodating conscientiously objecting physicians and
advertising executives. Rather, it is that if these claims are true,
then the current practice of treating physicians and advertising
executives differently may be consistent with according all
persons a conditional right of conscience, regardless of the
kind of belief they seek to uphold.
Though they are not as clear as Brock and Wicclair, Eva
and Hugh LaFollete also appear to endorse the preservation of a
person’s moral integrity as a sufficient justification for according
her a defeasible right of conscience. They write that “individuals
want to live their lives as they think best, and for many of us our
moral beliefs are especially important,” and that we empathize
with those who are forced to do what they think immoral.11
Nevertheless, they too argue that the right of conscience does
not extend to any and all beliefs to which a person might seek
to remain true, even at the expense of violating the law and/or
certain professional standards. Instead, they contend that a
person enjoys a conditional claim to accommodation only if
her beliefs are broadly similar to recognizable moral views,
they are ones for which the conscientious objector can offer
a defense, and they do not depend on implausible empirical
claims or clearly mistaken inferences. As I will explain, however,
they are wrong to do so.
Consider, first, LaFollete and LaFollete’s claim that “we
demand that someone who claims to be taking a stand on
conscience has views and employs reasoning reflecting values
and empirical beliefs broadly similar to recognizable moral
views.”12 They think such a demand justified because
otherwise it makes the notion of a “moral belief ”
meaningless. If someone said that she was
conscientiously opposed to feeding [her] children
or stopping at traffic lights, then, barring some
powerful explanation, we would not think that they
are forwarding moral beliefs, no matter how sincerely
uttered. If someone said that she was conscientiously
opposed to paying parking fines because it killed
humans, then, barring some powerful explanation,
we would likewise deny that she is forwarding a
moral claim.13
No doubt if someone advanced such a claim we would judge
it to be seriously mistaken, an obviously false belief. But I
see no reason to deny that these are moral beliefs (or, given
that the examples are under-described, that they could be).
After all, a person may conscientiously object to feeding her
children because she believes she has a duty not to do so
(just as Abraham believed he had a duty to sacrifice Isaac), or
because she thinks parental autonomy encompasses a right to
use starvation as a means for disciplining her children. Similarly,
she may believe that stopping at traffic lights constitutes the
acknowledgment of the state’s authority over her, and believe

that she is under a duty to acknowledge no earthly authority.
In each case, we can contrast the agent’s reason for behaving
as she does with prudential reasons a person might have for
doing so; for instance, the financial benefits of not having to
spend money on her children, or the thrill of running a red
light. As long as the contrast with self-interested reasons for
action remains, characterizing the objector’s beliefs as moral,
no matter how strange we may think it, does not render the
notion of a moral belief meaningless. As for the third example
LaFollete and LaFollete give to support their claim, involving
conscientious objection to paying parking fines, it does not
even involve a mistaken moral belief (at least if we assume
the humans referred to are innocent), but only an erroneous
belief regarding the causal connection between the payment
of parking fines and the killing of human beings.
Of course, to acknowledge that the examples LaFollete and
LaFollete give do constitute moral claims does not commit us to
accommodating those who wish to act on them (in violation of
the law). Rather, and as should be clear by now, the objector’s
claim to accommodation must be balanced against competing
moral interests, and in each of the examples LaFollete and
LaFollete give it seems quite clear that the objector’s right of
conscience will be defeated or outweighed by some other moral
consideration. For example, the state’s duty to ensure that the
objector’s children receive adequate nutrition defeats its duty to
accommodate her conscientious objection to her children being
fed. Thus LaFollete and LaFollete neither demonstrate that, on
pain of rendering the idea of a moral belief meaningless, we
must reject as moral those beliefs that are deeply at odds with
prevailing views, nor that doing so is necessary to justify the
conclusion that certain demands for accommodation clearly
ought to be rejected.
Unfortunately, LaFollete and LaFollete’s explication of
the claim that conscientious objectors must be able to offer
a defense of the principle they seek to uphold is brief and
somewhat muddled. For example, it is unclear whether a
conscientious objector herself must be able to provide a
minimally acceptable rational justification for the principle
in question, or if it suffices that she is an active member of a
community whose leaders can offer such a justification even
though she cannot, or weaker still, that it merely be possible
for someone to offer such a justification. More importantly,
however, LaFollete and LaFollete misidentify the reason the
conscientious objector offers the state in support of her claim
that it ought to accommodate her. That reason is not the truth or
reasonableness of the principles to which she wishes to remain
true; rather, it is the importance of preserving her moral integrity,
and so her sense of self-worth and of the meaning she finds in
the way of life she leads. In seeking accommodation from the
state, the conscientious objector does not rest her case on the
assertion that compliance with a particular law or professional
standard would be wrong.14 She likely believes that, of course,
and if the state fails to accommodate her then that belief will
likely figure in an explanation for her subsequent actions and
attitudes (e.g., her disobedience to law, or the guilt she feels
over having acted as the law requires). Still, the conscientious
objector’s claim vis-à-vis the state is that she cannot in good
conscience act as the law or professional code would have her
act. This is so because she believes that the law or professional
code conflicts with what morality truly requires, regardless of
whether her belief is warranted. The professional’s claim that
she cannot obey the law in good conscience highlights the
state’s reason for accommodating her, namely, its defeasible
duty to refrain from compelling agents to act contrary to their
sincerely held moral beliefs. What requires a defense, then,
is not the particular belief or commitment for which the
conscientious objector seeks accommodation, but the claim

— 10 —

— Philosophy and Law —

that people’s interest in maintaining their moral integrity is of
sufficient moral importance to ground a conditional right of
conscience. This position is one that LaFollete and LaFollete
appear prepared to accept.
Indeed, there is some reason to think that it is a conscientious
objector’s sincerity, and not the reasonableness of her beliefs or
the quality of her inferences per se, that concern LaFollete and
LaFollete. Having pointed out that conscientious refusal to fill
prescriptions for emergency contraception rests on moral and
non-moral beliefs that few people in the United States accept,
they do not conclude that such refusals are unreasonable
and so ought not to be accommodated. Rather, LaFollete and
LaFollete write that “although this does not necessarily mean
that the advocates of COP [a right of conscience to refuse to fill
prescriptions for emergency contraception] do not hold moral
views, it explains why their need to demonstrate that these are
sincere moral beliefs is even higher than for the COW [a right
of conscience to refuse to wage war] advocates.”15 This is a
very different position than the one they endorse elsewhere.
The reasonableness of a conscientious objector’s beliefs is no
longer an independent condition for a right of conscience, but
instead an evidentiary rule of thumb the state ought to employ
in determining whether a conscientious objector satisfies a
condition for such a right, namely, that he is sincere when he
asserts a belief in the immorality of the law, and that violating
it will require him to betray one of his deepest commitments.
Whatever the merits of employing such an epistemic rule, it
does not entail that there are certain sorts of beliefs that do not
fall within the scope of a conditional right of conscience.
The discussion above also explains why neither implausible
non-moral claims nor mistaken inferences vitiate a physician’s
defeasible claim to accommodation. In their discussion of some
pharmacists’ assertion of a right to conscientiously refuse to fill
prescriptions for the morning-after pill, LaFollete and LaFollete
challenge the claim that the use of this drug constitutes murder.
Robert F. Card pursues this issue in even greater detail, and
concludes that emergency contraception is problematic only
if contraception itself is considered morally unacceptable.16
Though I find these arguments compelling, I also think them
beside the point when it comes to the question of whether
pharmacists enjoy a conditional right to conscientiously refuse
to fill prescriptions for emergency contraception. No matter how
unreasonable a physician’s moral or non-moral beliefs, and no
matter how egregiously mistaken her reasoning may be, if she
believes that obedience to law will require her to act immorally
then the law threatens her integrity. If, as I have argued, the state
has a duty not to compel people to compromise their moral
integrity, then regardless of the kind of belief to which a person
seeks to remain true the state has a moral reason, albeit not a
conclusive one, to accommodate her.
Card briefly considers the position defended here and
offers three reasons to reject it. The first is a reductio ad
absurdum argument: if the right of conscience is not limited to
reasonable moral beliefs, he writes, then a person who objects
to military service because he believes that wearing green in
battle is morally evil has a right to accommodation.17 I find this
rebuttal unconvincing for several reasons. It is hard to imagine a
person sincerely holding this belief, and even harder to imagine
circumstances in which we could have good evidence that the
objector was sincere and not simply seeking to avoid military
service for self-interested reasons. Moreover, some would argue
that the belief in God (or in some specific conception of God),
or the belief that God’s will can be known through specific texts,
and so on, are just as absurd as the belief that wearing green
in battle is morally evil. If the former are thought to provide an
acceptable basis for a conditional right of conscience, a position

Card does not challenge, then why not the latter?18 Besides,
as should be clear by now, acknowledging a defeasible right
of conscience on the part of a person who objects to wearing
green in battle does not entail that, all things considered, this
person should be accommodated. All that follows is that the
state must not dismiss the objector’s claim out of hand, but
instead offer a justification for its refusal to accommodate
him (if, in fact, it does not do so) that identifies the competing
moral considerations the state believes defeat or outweigh the
objector’s right of conscience. Why think it absurd to require
such a rationale?
The second reason Card offers for rejecting a right of
conscience that encompasses fidelity to any moral belief, no
matter how unreasonable, is that “on this understanding a
provider can acceptably refuse EC [emergency contraception]
based on (e.g.) sexist beliefs that women are inferior and should
be pregnant as often as men want them to be.”19 Card claims
that this is a “troubling implication,” though he does not explain
why this is so. Admittedly, it would be a troubling implication if
the right of conscience were absolute, but I do not claim that it
is. Besides, it is not clear how a requirement that a conscientious
objector be able to demonstrate the reasonableness of his
belief addresses the challenge of weighing his claim to
accommodation against others’ competing moral claims,
including a woman’s (liberty-) right to become pregnant only
if she chooses to do so. Neither the plausibility of an objector’s
belief nor the quality of his moral reasoning make any difference
to the cost he will bear if the state refuses to accommodate
him, or the costs others will bear if it does exempt him from
particular legal and professional requirements (costs which may
determine the conditions under which a physician’s desire to be
exempt from the law ought to be accommodated). Finally, we
must be careful not to confuse the state’s accommodation of
a conscientious objector with an endorsement of the principle
he seeks to uphold. Indeed, legal recognition of a sexist
physician’s right of conscience (under certain conditions) is
perfectly consistent with criticism by the state of the principle
the physician believes ought to guide his conduct.
Card’s third reason for rejecting an unrestricted right of
conscience is that such a conception is at odds with the one
currently employed by the military. Conscientious objectors to
military service must defend themselves before a review board
which awards an exemption from military service only for
certain reasons (or, in many countries, only one reason, namely,
opposition to killing (humans) in any circumstance). Were
Card to raise the example of conscientious objection to military
service solely for the purpose of challenging the claim that
pharmacists enjoy an absolute right to conscientiously refuse
to fill prescriptions for emergency contraception, as LaFollete
and LaFollete sometimes seem to do, then it would carry some
argumentative weight. Given that the right to conscientiously
refuse to perform military service is a conditional one, it would
be surprising were the same not true of a right to conscientiously
refuse to fill prescriptions for emergency contraception.
But current practices vis-à-vis conscientious objection to
military service do not support Card’s claim that the right of
conscience is limited to reasonable moral beliefs and valid
arguments. When a military review board investigates a putative
conscientious objector’s claim to accommodation, it focuses
almost exclusively on evidence for the sincerity of the objector’s
opposition to killing in all circumstances. It makes no effort to
assess the reasonableness of the world view that has led the
objector to view all killing as immoral, nor to the quality of the
objector’s reasoning (or that of the community to which he
belongs and from which he has acquired his belief). Moreover,
the fact that states currently place certain restrictions on the
sorts of beliefs fidelity to which they will accommodate does
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not justify those restrictions. That is not to say that the current
policy regarding conscientious objectors to military service is
unjustified. Rather, it is only to point out that, in the absence of
a clearly articulated rationale for the current policy, we cannot
infer from it that the state ought to acknowledge a defeasible
claim to accommodation only for those objectors with beliefs
it judges to be reasonable.
The arguments to this point, I believe, strongly support
the position that there are no restrictions on the kind of
commitments a person may assert a conditional right to uphold
in the face of legal and professional obligations to do otherwise.
Still, might the fact that a physician voluntarily enters the
profession, and so freely and knowingly takes on the obligations
attached to her professional role, entail that the state has no
duty at all to accommodate her conscientious refusal to provide
legally and professionally sanctioned services? LaFollete and
LaFollete think so; they write that the case for even a conditional
right of conscience is “far from overwhelmingly convincing, in
large part, because they [medical professionals] entered the
profession voluntarily, and because what they are being asked
to do is a core part of their respective professions.”20 Brock, too,
argues that in many cases a person’s freely choosing to take
on a certain professional role, one she knew, or ought to have
known, would require her to perform certain tasks, entails that
she must either do so or exit that role (and, possibly, the entire
profession).21 Were the argument from consent successful,
it would render all of the previous discussion moot. The
argument fails, or at least it is incomplete, and an explanation
of its shortcomings reveals the importance of resolving the
dispute over restrictions on the scope of a professional’s right
of conscience that has been the focus of this essay.
The appeal to a professional’s voluntary entry into the
profession to rebut her assertion of a right of conscience either
evidences a failure to grasp the fundamental nature of the
conscientious objector’s claim against the state, or begs the
question against her. In declaring a right to conscientiously
refuse to provide a particular service, a professional contends
that neither the profession nor the state are morally (or,
perhaps, legally) entitled to make provision of that service, in all
circumstances, a condition for being licensed to practice. It is
no response to this contention to simply assert that the objector
voluntarily entered the profession. Rather, what the state (and
the profession) must offer is a justification for making the right
to practice conditional on a willingness to provide the service in
question, with no accommodation for conscientious objectors
other than in those cases that the state and the profession
already recognize. Surely it will be able to do so in some cases.
In others, however, it may not; that is, it may have no justification
for refusing to accommodate those who conscientiously object
to performing the service in question, at least under certain
conditions. If, nevertheless, the state makes no attempt to
accommodate these conscientious objectors, then it makes
the freedom to practice dependent on conditions it lacks a
moral right to impose. That claim—that neither the state nor
the profession may make the liberty to practice conditional on
consent to provide particular services in the circumstances in
question—is the heart of an objector’s claim when she asserts
a right of conscience. Where the protest is to the terms to which
a person must agree in order to enjoy a particular privilege, the
claim that the person did agree to the terms fails to grapple
with the objection.
Disputes over the specific terms the state may justly impose
on those who wish to practice medicine highlight the need
for a compelling account of legitimate state authority, one
that can provide the background against which the argument
from consent may be more compelling. In particular, some

justification must be offered for why the conscientiously
objecting physician or pharmacist has a moral duty to defer to
the state’s judgment that the present terms to which medical
professionals must agree in order to enjoy a license to practice
do not violate her right of conscience. Possibly that justification
also rests on the physician’s consent, in this case to the state’s
rule, though as I argue elsewhere there are good reasons to
doubt that modern states’ moral authority rests on the consent
of the governed.22 The point I wish to emphasize here, however,
is only that the argument from consent does not suffice by itself
to establish that physicians lack a conditional moral right to
conscientiously refuse to provide specific legal and professional
services.23
Endnotes
1. Though obviously crucial for a complete account of a medical
professional’s right of conscience, the question of exactly
what type of legal accommodation a just state ought to offer
professionals who object to providing particular services is
not one I explore in any detail here.
2. Such a right may also be justified on instrumental grounds, say
because legal accommodation of medical professionals that
conscientiously object to fulfilling certain legal obligations
strengthens the state’s and the profession’s de facto
legitimacy, which leads in turn to greater overall compliance
with the law and the profession’s code of conduct than
would occur were the state to refuse to accommodate
them. Though I think there are good instrumental reasons
for accommodating conscientious objectors in certain
circumstances, they do not exhaust the reasons for doing so
had by a just state, or the private actors to which it delegates
some of its authority.
3. In a paper entitled “Petitions for Conscientious Objector
Status: Right, Excuse, or Plea for Mercy?” (unpublished
manuscript on file with author), I examine in detail the
case for grounding a right of conscience in the importance
of protecting an agent’s integrity, as well as in respect for
a person’s status as an autonomous agent. Here I largely
assume that a person’s interest in preserving his or her
integrity suffices to ground a right of conscience—which,
again, is a view that many philosophical defenders of a right
of conscience explicitly adopt—and consider whether the
state’s reason to protect a person’s integrity depends on the
content of the particular belief to which that person wishes
to remain true.
4. Might a person’s integrity merit preservation only insofar as
the standards to which she wishes to display fidelity are true,
or at least reasonable? To give an affirmative answer to this
question seems to me to be too dismissive of the suffering
that even someone with reprehensible beliefs will experience
should she be compelled to betray them, or else suffer the
myriad negative consequences associated with breaking the
law. Admittedly, however, the question of how much weight
a just state should give to such a person’s suffering deserves
more systematic treatment than I can offer here.
5. Dan Brock, “Conscientious Refusal by Physicians and
Pharmacists: Who Is Obligated to do What, and Why?”
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 29 (2008): 189.
6. Ibid., 190.
7. Note that the issue here concerns a tradeoff between
two rights—the right to integrity and the right to medical
treatment (conditional, perhaps, on the ability to pay for it).
In Dworkinian terms, it is a conflict within the domain of
principled arguments, not between principle and policy.
8. Jacob M. Appel, “May Doctors Refuse Infertility Treatments to
Gay Patients?” Hastings Center Report 36, no. 4 (2006): 20.
9. Mark R. Wicclair, “Conscientious Objection in Medicine,”
Bioethics 14, no. 3 (2000): 214.
10. Ibid., 216. See also Mark R. Wicclair, “Reasons and Healthcare
Professionals’ Claims of Conscience,” American Journal of
Bioethics 7:6 (2007): 21.

— 12 —

— Philosophy and Law —
11. Eva LaFollete and Hugh LaFollete, “Private Conscience, Public
Acts,” Journal of Medical Ethics 33 (2007): 249.
12. Ibid., 252.
13. Ibid.
14. Of course, a person who petitions the state for accommodation
of her conscience may also contest the justice of the law from
which she seeks an exemption, either by legal or illegal
means (e.g., civil disobedience), or both. Still, conceptually,
and sometimes in practice, we can distinguish between
an agent’s seeking an exemption from a legal requirement
and contesting its justice for the purpose of reform or
repudiation. For discussion, see Lefkowitz, “Petitions for
Conscientious Objector Status: Right, Excuse, or Plea for
Mercy?” unpublished manuscript on file with author.
15. Ibid., 250.
16. Robert F. Card, “Conscientious objection and emergency
contraception,” American Journal of Bioethics 7, no. 6 (2007):
11.
17. Ibid., 13.
18. As one discussant said, there are all sorts of beliefs that would
strike us as crazy if held by only one person but that are not
so viewed because they are held by a group of people.
19. Ibid., 13.
20. LaFollete and LaFollete, “Private Conscience,” 254.
21. Brock, “Conscientious Refusal,” 191.
22. David Lefkowitz, “The Duty To Obey the Law,” Philosophy
Compass 1 (2006): 1-28.
23. I wish to thank the Hoffberger Center at the University of
Baltimore, and especially Fred Guy, for the invitation to
present this paper at the conference on Philosophy and
Law. I benefited greatly from the comments of Josh Kassner,
Tony Reeves, Stefan Sciarraffa, and the editors of the APA
Newsletter on Philosophy and Law.

— 13 —

